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10 Electoral Punishment and Protest 
Politics in Times of Crisis
Björn Bremer, Swen Hutter, and Hanspeter Kriesi
10.1  Introduction
This chapter links the political consequences of the Great Recession 
in the electoral arena and the protest arena. Integrated research on the 
two types of responses is important because, in democratic regimes, 
the citizens’ response to the crisis might, first of all, be an electoral 
one. However, contentious reactions in the protest arena are another, 
often closely related way for the people to express their discontent espe-
cially in periods of economic and political crises. Unfortunately, elec-
toral research tends to ignore the connections between the dynamics 
of opposition in the two arenas of mass politics (e.g., Hutter 2014b; 
McAdam and Tarrow 2010, 2013). This is unfortunate because these 
connections may trigger profound changes in the dynamics and struc-
ture of political conflict – as exemplified by the recent waves of protest 
and the rise of so-called movement parties in southern Europe (e.g., 
Altiparmakis and Lorenzini 2018; della Porta et al. 2017).
The chapter presents yet another step to further advance our under-
standing of the link between protest and electoral politics. It focuses 
on aggregate shifts in voting behaviour and protest politics across the 
thirty countries covered by this volume. More specifically, we exam-
ine the relationship between the two arenas in two steps. First, we ask 
whether electoral and protest politics are driven by the same kind of 
economic and political factors. Then, we ask whether protest mobiliza-
tion influences the extent of the economic vote.
To derive our expectations, we combine the literature on economic 
voting with social movement research. As shown in previous chap-
ters, the link between economic factors and protest politics varies 
depending on the type of economic grievances and features of the 
political context. In this chapter, we draw on economic voting lit-
erature to discuss electoral punishment in times of crisis, and on 
the social movement literature to highlight that even if there are 
no opportunities for immediate electoral punishment, the electoral 
cycle is embedded in an ongoing process of political mobilization that 
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interacts with elections in complex ways. More precisely, we empha-
size the role of protests in politicizing economic grievances: We argue 
that protests act as a ‘signalling mechanism’ by attributing blame to 
decision-makers and by highlighting the political dimension of dete-
riorating economic conditions. Ultimately, massive protest mobiliza-
tion should, therefore, amplify the impact of economic hardship on 
electoral punishment.
For the empirical analysis, we combine our protest event data with 
data on electoral outcomes in the thirty European countries covered by 
the study. The electoral dataset builds on the one used by Hernández 
and Kriesi (2016) in their study on the electoral consequences of the 
Great Recession. We updated this dataset so that it includes all national 
parliamentary elections in the thirty countries from January 2000 to 
December 2015. Overall, the data cover 118 elections. The first elec-
tion included in the dataset is the Romanian election in November 
2000; the last election included in the dataset is the Spanish election in 
December 2015. A key ambition of the chapter is to make the results 
for electoral and protest politics as comparable as possible. Therefore, 
we aim to standardize the units of analysis and measures across the two 
arenas.1
10.2   Economic Crisis, Political Context, and Citizens’ 
Responses in Electoral and Protest Politics
In contrast to the literature on economic voting, social movement stud-
ies have neglected the role of economic conditions as an explanatory 
factor for increasing or declining protest levels for several decades. This 
changed with the onset of the Great Recession which brought ques-
tions of economic strains, deprivation, and capitalism back to the study 
of social movements (e.g. Beissinger and Sasse 2014; della Porta 2015; 
Galais and Lorenzini 2017; Grasso and Giugni 2016; Klandermans and 
van Stekelenburg 2016; Muñoz et al. 2014; Quaranta 2016; Vráblíková 
2017). Following this line of research, the previous chapters of this 
 volume have also reconsidered the effects of economic grievances 
and their interactions with political factors on protest mobilization 
 1 The chapter is based on a revised and shortened version of our article Dynamics 
of Protest and Electoral Politics in the Great Recession published by the European 
Journal of Political Research, doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12375. In this 
chapter, we rely on an alternative measure for the dynamics of protest mobilization 
which emphasizes within-country variations. Interested readers should consult the 
journal article and its online appendix because they offer additional robustness 
checks and descriptive information.
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(in particular, Chapters 7–9). In what follows we scan the economic 
voting literature to highlight its very similar expectations with regard to 
the effects of economic trends on electoral politics.
Like the explanatory model introduced in Chapter 1 of this volume, 
the economic voting literature starts with the economic context. That is, 
it assumes instrumentally rational voters, who reward or punish the 
incumbents with their vote depending on the economic conditions. 
It thus adopts a simple reward–punishment mechanism (e.g. Duch and 
Stevenson 2008; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2007). Empirical research 
based on the idea shows that economic voting is pervasive both in ‘nor-
mal’ and ‘crisis’ periods. Increasing work also documents how strongly 
incumbents were punished in the Great Recession and that the pun-
ishment varies in line with the predictions of the economic voting lit-
erature, i.e. according to how hard the economic crisis hit individual 
countries (e.g. Bartels 2014; Hernández and Kriesi 2016; Kriesi 2014; 
Talving 2017, 2018).
The pervasiveness of the effects in times of crisis is far from obvi-
ous given that the economic voting literature has also highlighted 
that the extent of electoral punishment is conditioned by the politi-
cal context. Since Powell and Whitten’s (1993) landmark study, the 
concept ‘clarity of political responsibility’ has been used to describe 
the finding that the voters’ assessment of the government’s economic 
performance plays a stronger role, if the institutional context allows 
the voters to clearly attribute the responsibility for the economic per-
formance to the government (see also Duch and Stevenson 2008). 
In times of increasing economic globalization and authority shifts 
to supra- and international institutions, scholars have documented 
that voters are less likely to punish national governments in bad 
economic periods because they perceive the constraints of national 
governments’ inf luence on economic developments (e.g., Duch and 
Stevenson 2008; Hellwig 2010; Hellwig and Samuels 2007; Soroka 
and Wlezien 2010).
As the current economic crisis brought to the fore the strong eco-
nomic and political interdependencies in Europe, the previous argu-
ments would let us expect that the impact of economic conditions 
on the punishment of incumbents should be weaker – or at least not 
stronger – in the Great Recession. This is also what some empirical 
studies show (e.g. Magalhães 2014; Talving 2017). However, other 
scholars in the economic voting field suggest that we should be cau-
tious here. For example, Lobo and Lewis-Beck (2017: 616f.) empha-
size that some of the negative findings might simply be methodological 
artefacts. That  is, studies based on individual-level cross-sectional 
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data are not able to grasp the effects of the economic vote because of 
restricted  variance. In a context of a profound economic crisis, a large 
part of  society – regardless of partisan attachments – acknowledges the 
 economic problems.2
Following Hernández and Kriesi (2016), there is yet another rea-
son for why scholars might have found differing results of the crisis 
on the economic vote, namely timing. The current economic crisis in 
Europe unfolded in stages that unleashed dramatic political dynam-
ics in some of the hardest-hit countries. However, it is important to 
keep in mind that while the initial economic shock affected almost 
all European countries, the economic prospects of most, but not all, 
improved fairly quickly thereafter (see Chapter 1). Thus, the voters in 
the countries where the economy continued to stagnate or even expe-
rienced a pronounced double-dip recession are likely to have perceived 
the incumbents’ failure as particularly serious, not only compared to 
their pre-2008 situation, but also compared to other countries (on the 
role of benchmarking, see Kayser and Peress 2012).
Moreover, the diverging economic trends have become most pro-
nounced within the eurozone and the political processes to cope with 
the situation involved above all the EU’s intergovernmental channel 
(e.g. Laffan 2016). Ultimately, countries that needed assistance to bail 
out their financial and public institutions had to accept strong con-
ditions by their international creditors. While this might again have 
diffused political responsibility, it may also have strengthened the role 
of national governments in the public debate and their perceived (in-)
ability to successfully negotiate internationally (Hutter et al. 2016). As 
Marsh and Mikhaylov’s (2012) study on the Irish case convincingly 
illustrates, the national governments’ decisions on how to cope with 
the crisis and mounting pressures from international institutions and 
financial markets has been decisive for their electoral punishment 
rather than the sheer size of the economic decline.
Overall, the arguments on the conditional effects of the economic 
context on electoral losses of incumbents resemble the effects on pro-
test mobilization that we have uncovered in the previous chapters. In 
other words, both electoral losses and protest mobilization seem to be 
 2 Thus, one needs to rely on other types of research designs: Focus either on aggregate 
electoral outcomes in a large-N setting (e.g. Dassonneville and Lewis-Beck 2014; 
Hernández and Kriesi 2016) or on a pooled design of several surveys (e.g. Fraile and 
Lewis-Beck 2014), or structural equation modelling with individual-level panel data 
(e.g. Chzhen et al. 2014). Such designs indicate that the economic vote is stronger in 
a crisis situation.
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driven by poor economic performance, especially in later stages of the 
crisis and under conditions of external political constraints. In the pres-
ent chapter we shall document the parallel effects of the economic crisis 
on protest and electoral politics in a more systematic way.
10.3  The Signalling Function of Protest Politics
Establishing whether the same economic and political forces drive the 
ups and downs in electoral losses and protest mobilization can only 
be a first step, however. Given that the electoral arena is embedded in 
an ongoing process of political mobilization, the present chapter also 
seeks to analyse whether and how protests might have aggravated elec-
toral losses of incumbents in the Great Recession. More specifically, we 
emphasize the role of protest as a ‘signalling mechanism’ that attributes 
blame to decision-makers and highlights the political dimension of dete-
riorating economic conditions.
Regarding the dynamics of electoral and protest politics, we start by 
observing, as we have already done in Chapter 8, that, in democratic 
societies, citizens have the right to vote and they have the opportu-
nity to express their grievances as voters. In democracies, grievances 
are first expressed in the voting booth simply because, as Piven and 
Cloward (1977: 15) have pointed out, ‘whether defiant or not, people 
have been socialized within a political culture that defines voting as 
the mechanism through which political change can and should prop-
erly occur’. Accordingly, one of the first signs of popular discontent are 
sharp shifts in the voting patterns. However, the movement literature 
emphasizes also that, in the absence of immediately available options in 
the institutionalized arenas, discontented groups of citizens are likely 
to resort to the protest arena, and try to force political concessions 
from political elites by directly appealing to the general public. This 
is Schattschneider’s (1960) idea of the ‘expansion of conflict’. Such 
a view of political conflict is most prominent in the agenda-setting 
literature, and recent contributions from that tradition emphasize the 
power of protest to signal discontent and raise the salience of certain 
issues and concerns in more institutionalized arenas (e.g. Vliegenthart 
et al. 2016).
The pressure from below tends to strengthen the opposition and 
other allies of the protesting groups in the political system, which may 
be the main reason why opposition parties support or even create such 
protest in the first place. The controversial public debates that result 
from the expansion of conflict by protest mobilization increase the 
legitimacy of speakers and allies of protest movements with journalists 
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and decision-makers, who tend to closely follow the public debates 
(Gamson and Meyer 1996: 288). Wolfsfeld’s (1997: 47) ‘principle 
of political resonance’ formulates this relationship in a concise way: 
Challengers who succeed in producing events which resonate with the 
professional and political culture of important news media can compete 
with much more powerful adversaries. As the literature on movement 
outcomes highlights, the stronger the pressure exerted from below, the 
more likely it is that the government will be forced to make some con-
cessions (for a recent overview, see Bosi et al. 2016).
For our argument, it is important that such protest actions may 
set in motion contentious episodes involving a sequence of interac-
tions between the government and its challengers (see McAdam et al. 
2001). In these sequences, the protest mobilization puts pressure on 
the governing elites to make some concessions and, most importantly, 
it attributes responsibility to these elites for deteriorating economic 
conditions. Thus, protest serves as a signal that points to the political 
dimension of the problem at stake. The protest campaigns that have 
emerged in the context of the Great Recession and that opposed aus-
terity and called for democratic renewal are telling examples of these 
dynamics. As the previous chapters in this volume have shown, the 
public’s response in the protest arena had a clear message – a message 
that emphasized the responsibility of both national and European elites 
for mismanaging the economic crisis and for exacerbating problems of 
democratic representation (see also Altiparmakis and Lorenzini 2018; 
della Porta 2015).
To accommodate the pressure from the streets, incumbent parties 
have above all resorted to procedural concessions: changes in leader-
ship, reshuffles of the cabinet composition, calls for early elections or 
ceding responsibility to a care-taker government composed of tech-
nocrats (which will manage the consequences of the crisis until the 
regularly scheduled elections). In the Great Recession, these were all 
reoccurring strategies used by incumbents. The most important case 
is clearly Greece, where all these elements occurred in an exception-
ally short period (e.g. Verney 2014). Procedural concessions were more 
likely than substantive ones, given the general predicament of European 
governments today. As a result of the financial and economic crisis, the 
governments all over Europe found themselves between the proverbial 
rock (international pressure) and a hard place (domestic expectations) 
(Mair 2013). The situation of governments in the countries that were 
hardest hit by the crisis proved to be particularly uncomfortable in this 
respect. Not only were they likely to be exposed to domestic pressure 
in the streets, but they also faced international pressure by a series of 
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international stakeholders, who expected them to act responsibly, i.e. to 
execute the measures deemed necessary by the ‘market’.
Against the background of these observations, the interaction 
between protest and electoral punishment likely played out in scenario 
like this: At the first possible occasion, the voters punish the incum-
bents as predicted by the economic voter approach. In countries most 
severely hit by the crisis, the discontented groups mobilize against aus-
terity measures even before the first elections, in an active attempt to 
signal their discontent to the incumbents, or to bring them down (in 
the next national elections). In response to the protest mobilizations, 
the incumbents make some procedural concessions, but they do not 
succeed in satisfying the discontented voters, who severely punish them 
in the first national elections after the beginning of the crisis. In these 
elections, voters will vote into office the established opposition parties. 
Once in charge of the government, the former opposition however, is 
hardly able to adopt any other policy than the previous government, 
given the economic constraints imposed by the legacy of the former 
government, the conditions imposed by the rescuers (International 
Monetary Fund [IMF] and EU), and by the ‘markets’. Such a situa-
tion is likely to further boost protest in the streets, which emphasizes 
the responsibility of the government for the economic situation and 
therefore increases electoral punishment in follow-up crisis elections. 
Partly as a result of the protests, the voters are bound to notice that 
the new government is forced to take just the same measures as its pre-
decessors, whom they had voted out of office, and they may resort to 
punishing the mainstream parties as a whole in the following elections – 
by turning to new challengers or by exiting from the established 
electoral channel altogether. Thus, the result may be an even more 
profound destabilization of party systems (see Hernández and Kriesi 
2016; Roberts 2014, 2017).
While the punishment of mainstream parties might concern par-
ties from all ideological camps, there are at least two reasons why 
the mainstream left might be in a particularly uncomfortable situa-
tion. On the one hand, the left’s traditional policy programs are even 
more at odds with the recommended austerity policies and structural 
reforms that governments in most countries implemented after 2010. 
Therefore, as illustrated by the Latin American experience (Lupu 
2014; Roberts 2014, 2017), the mainstream left in power risks an even 
stronger brand dilution and alienation of its support base than the 
mainstream right when it adopts and implements austerity. On the 
other hand, the traditionally close alliances between political par-
ties from the left and social movements (Kriesi 1995; Maguire 1995) 
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might further erode in the context of the current crisis and backfire 
in terms of electoral support. That is, the challengers in the streets 
might be particularly adversarial towards their former allies while vot-
ers of mainstream left parties might be particularly receptive to the 
signalling mechanism of protests.
In this chapter, we do not study the proposed sequences in detail, but 
we develop several important expectations about the impact of protest 
mobilization on electoral punishment in the Great Recession. First, we 
expect that deteriorating economic conditions lead to electoral punish-
ment and protest mobilization, especially in later periods of the  crisis 
and under conditions of external political constraints. Second, we 
expect that protests play an important role in attributing responsibil-
ity for the economic decline and the growing cross-national dispari-
ties to the national and European elites. Thus, massive protests should 
amplify the connections between economic misery and the punishment 
of governments in national elections. We suggest calling this the ‘sig-
nalling mechanism’ of protest and, empirically, we expect to find that 
economic voting is stronger in contexts of high protest mobilization. 
Third, protest mobilization should intensify the feeling among voters 
that there is a more fundamental ‘crisis of representation’ as a change in 
government may not result in a change of policy. Thus, we expect that 
protest mobilization may act as an important trigger of the destabiliza-
tion of European party systems by highlighting that mainstream parties 
(both in opposition and in government) no longer fulfil their repre-
sentative functions. Finally, the effect of protest on the punishment of 
incumbents might be particularly severe for the mainstream left.
To sum up, we formulate the following hypotheses:
H1: The same economic and political factors influence the 
electoral losses of incumbents and the strength of protest 
mobilization (equivalence hypothesis).
H2: The impact of economic misery on electoral losses of 
the incumbent should be amplified by protest mobilization 
( signalling hypothesis).
H3: The positive effect of protest on electoral losses holds for 
all mainstream parties in both government and opposition 
(party system destabilization hypothesis).
H4: The positive effect of protest on electoral losses of the 
incumbents is stronger when the political left is in power 
(left-wing punishment hypothesis).
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10.4   Measuring Shifts in Electoral and  
Protest Politics
To make the measures for the aggregate shifts in protest and electoral 
politics as comparable as possible, we focus on electoral changes and 
protests in a given legislative period. For this purpose, we calculate two 
key variables from our electoral dataset. First, we calculate the electoral 
loss of the prime minister’s party in a given country as the change in 
the vote share of that party between a given election at time t and t −1. 
Second, we calculate the electoral losses for individual parties as the 
change in the vote share for each party between a given election at time 
t and t −1. The two variables allow us to focus on the electoral support 
of the chief executive (the key indicator of most economic voting stud-
ies) and of all types of parties. From our protest dataset we calculate 
one key variable. Specifically, we focus on public economic protests and 
compute the relative number of protest events per legislative period in 
every country. This number is calculated by comparing the number of 
events in a given legislative period in a given country to the average (or 
normal) level of protest in that country. Specifically, it is calculated in 
the following way:







where ∑PPLP is the sum of all protest events in a given legislative period, 
MLP is the number of months in a given legislative period, and ∑PPm,c 
is the average number of protest events per month in a given country.3 
The measure indicates up- or downward deviations from the ‘normal’ 
flow of protest in a given country. Moreover, the focus on the legislative 
periods reflects the practice in the economic voting literature and takes 
into account more sustained upward trends over a longer period of 
time. We combine the information about the relative number of protest 
 3 For this analysis, we follow the other chapters and weigh protest participation by 
the sampling probability (applied on the document level), the log of population size, 
and the agency weight. Please see Bremer et al. (2020) for an analysis with a simpler 
dependent variable and extensive robustness checks.
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events with the first dataset on electoral outcomes and, finally, we stan-
dardize all our dependent and continuous independent variables in 
order to make them more easily comparable.
10.5   Economic Misery, Timing, and Bailouts as 
Drivers of Electoral and Protest Politics
Following the literature on economic voting, we start our analysis by 
assessing the importance of the economic context on both electoral 
losses and protest mobilization. In contrast to the previous chapters, we 
study changes in protest over longer units of time, i.e. legislative periods. 
Therefore, we can rely on three different economic indicators to measure 
the change in economic conditions in a given country at a given time: 
(1) change in the unemployment rate between the election at time t −1 
and t; (2) change in the gross domestic product (GDP) between the elec-
tion at time t −1 and t; (3) and change in the level of government debt (as 
a percentage of GDP) between the election at time t −1 and t. We com-
bine these three indicators to create a summary measure of a country’s 
‘economic misery’ because we expect that citizens should respond more 
strongly to general economic trends than evolution of specific macroeco-
nomic indicators, such as unemployment. An exploratory factor analysis 
indicates that all three indicators load strongly on a single dimension and 
thus we estimate a misery index based on the factor scores. This index 
increases as economic conditions worsen.
In the first step of our analysis we compare the factors that drive 
punishment in electoral and protest politics. To that end, we use simple 
ordinary least square (OLS) regression analysis with the electoral loss 
of the prime minister’s party and the relative number of protest events 
in a given legislative period as two dependent variables in separate anal-
yses. Table 10.1 presents the results for both electoral and protest poli-
tics. As predicted, a higher level of economic misery is related to higher 
electoral losses in the bivariate model shown in the first column of the 
table: A one standard deviation increase in misery will lead to a 0.34 
standard deviation increase in electoral loss of the incumbent. Turning 
to protest, we find a similar pattern and confirm the results of previ-
ous chapters: A higher level of economic misery is related to a higher 
level of protest mobilization. This effect is a little bit smaller than the 
one for electoral politics, but still significant: A one standard deviation 
increase in misery will lead to a 0.31 standard deviation increase in the 
number of protests. Disaggregating the economic misery index in its 
individual components shows that all components are correlated with 
electoral and protest punishment (results not shown). However, in a 
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joint model, only unemployment has a statistically significant effect on 
electoral punishment, whereas both rising unemployment and public 
debt significantly affect protest mobilization.
To test whether timing plays a role for both protest and electoral poli-
tics, we created a variable that indicates whether an election was a pre-
crisis election, a first-crisis election, or a later-crisis election. For elections 
that have occurred after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 
2008, we distinguish between ‘first’ and ‘later-crisis elections’: In each 
country, the first election that took place after October 2008 is coded 
as ‘first-crisis election’, while all later elections are coded as ‘later-crisis 
elections’.4
Our expectation is also supported by the results presented in 
Table 10.1. Models 3 and 4 indicate that both the electoral punishment 
of the incumbent and protests were greater during the Great Recession 
 4 Overall, the analysis covers fifty-nine pre-crisis elections, thirty first-crisis elec-
tions, and twenty-nine later-crisis elections. Austria had an election in September 
2008 two weeks after the collapse of Lehman Brothers. We consider this crisis still 
as a pre-crisis election as it was not really fought in the shadow of the financial crisis.













Misery 0.34*** 0.31*** 0.00 −0.01 0.06 −0.01
(3.86) (3.78) (0.02) (−0.07) (0.35) (−0.04)
1st Crisis Elect. 0.30 0.17 0.18 0.16
(1.26) (0.84) (0.77) (0.79)
Later-Crisis Elect. 0.17 −0.17 −0.05 −0.18
(0.72) (−0.85) (−0.22) (−0.86)
1st Crisis Elect.  
# Misery
0.32 0.13 0.22 0.13
(1.44) (0.72) (1.01) (0.68)
Later-Crisis Elect.  
# Misery
0.70* 1.41*** 0.49+ 1.39***
(2.47) (5.97) (1.74) (5.70)
Bailout = 1 0.73** 0.04
(2.87) (0.19)
Constant 0.00 0.04 −0.23 −0.11 −0.23 −0.11
(0.00) (0.44) (−1.56) (−0.87) (−1.60) (−0.86)
Observations 118 118 118 118 118 118
R2 0.11 0.11 0.17 0.35 0.22 0.35
t statistics in parentheses.
+p < 0.1; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.


















































Figure 10.1 Average marginal effect of misery on electoral loss and 
protest – the importance of the crisis. (a) Electoral loss and (b) protest 
politics.
Note: Figures based on models 3 and 4 of Table 10.1, respectively.
than prior to it, but the results are not statistically significant. However, 
to test the timing argument, we need to consider the interaction effect of 
economic misery and our timing variable. As shown in models 3 and 4, 
the interaction between economic misery and both electoral losses and 
protests is positive and statistically significant in later-crisis elections. That 
is, in later-crisis elections, economic misery increases electoral losses and 
protests more than it did in previous elections. These interactions are 
also shown in Figure 10.1, which plots the average marginal effect of 
economic misery by election type. Figure 10.1a suggests that citizens 
perceived the worsening economic conditions as a greater failure of the 
incumbent party during later-crisis elections than in first-crisis elections. 
As the crisis progressed, governments that failed to address the economic 
situations of their countries were more severely punished than parties 
that were in office at the beginning of the crisis. Figure 10.1b shows the 
same pattern for protest. It indicates that in the immediate aftermath 
of the collapse of Lehman Brothers, citizens did not increasingly voice 
their discontent in the streets as the economic conditions worsened. 
However, there is a strong positive effect of economic misery on the level 
of protest during later stages of the economic crisis.
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Finally, we look at the associations between bailouts and citizens’ 
responses in the two arenas. Here, we rely on a variable that indicates 
whether a country was bailed out by the IMF or the European Stability 
Mechanism, implying external political constraints (see Chapter 9). 
According to the results of models 5 and 6 in Table 10.1, bailouts are 
associated only with higher electoral punishment but not protest pun-
ishment. Although the coefficient in model 6 is also positive, it is not 
statistically significant. It indicates that international bailouts did not 
systematically increase the number of people that protested during 
our period of study, at least not when we use legislative periods as the 
unit of analysis (for a more fine-grained analysis of this question, see 
Chapter 9).
Overall, we interpret these results as supporting our equivalence 
hypothesis (H1). We find very similar effects of economic misery on the 
electoral support of incumbents and on the level of economic protests. 
Moreover, these effects tend to become stronger in ‘later-crisis elec-
tions’ when the economic situation in Europe diverged ever more and 
voters already had a chance to punish their governments at the ballot 
box. However, when focusing on legislative periods, we cannot detect 
a statistically significant and positive effect of bailouts on the level of 
protest mobilization, whereas we observe such an effect for the electoral 
performance of the ruling party.
10.6   Protest, the Economic Vote, and the  
Signalling Mechanism
However, as suggested earlier, it is misleading to treat the two arenas 
of mass politics as independent. Instead, both are interwoven with 
national and international political dynamics and there is reason to 
believe that protest politics and electoral politics are closely related. 
Consequently, we move beyond the existing economic voting model 
and test the importance of protest mobilization as an explanatory vari-
able for electoral punishment. To that end, we test the influence of 
protest on electoral punishment. Using OLS regression analysis, we 
repeat the analysis from the first step with electoral punishment as the 
dependent variable, but we now include protest mobilization in the leg-
islative period before the election as an independent variable. To test 
our signalling hypothesis, we include an interaction between protest 
mobilization and the economic misery indicator. Otherwise this analy-
sis mirrors the analysis in the first step.
Table 10.2 presents the results from this exercise. The first column 
indicates that the bivariate relationship between protest and electoral 
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punishment is positive and statistically significant: A 1 standard devi-
ation increase in protest is associated with a 0.32 standard deviation 
increase in economic voting. However, when controlling for misery 
(model 2), this effect becomes smaller. Moreover, contrary to our 
expectations, there seems to be no interaction effect between economic 
misery and protest (model 3): Instead the bivariate relationship between 
electoral and protest punishment is mostly driven by a third factor, 
namely economic misery. However, when repeating the same analysis 
for western Europe only (models 4–6), the results change. Importantly, 
there is now a positive and statistically significant interaction effect of 
protest and economic misery in model 6, which indicates that in western 
Europe the impact of economic misery on electoral punishment can be 
amplified by protest punishment (which supports the signalling hypothe-
sis H2). This effect is also shown in Figure 10.2, which plots the average 
marginal effect of misery on the electoral loss of the incumbent across 
different levels of protest for western Europe. It shows that in western 
Europe this effect is substantial: When there is little protest, economic 
misery is not associated with electoral losses for incumbents; only when 
there are large protests, the effect of misery becomes important.
The regional differences in this analysis confirm findings from 
the previous chapters and existing research. For eastern Europe, where 
party systems are less institutionalised, Hernández and Kriesi (2016) 
Table 10.2. Electoral loss: Protest as an independent variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All countries Western Europe
Elect. Elect. Elect. Elect. Elect. Elect.
Protest 0.32** 0.22* 0.14 0.28*** 0.14* 0.02
(3.36) (2.29) (1.10) (4.05) (2.23) (0.27)
Misery 0.27** 0.26** 0.42*** 0.39***
(2.95) (2.77) (5.48) (5.08)
Protest # Misery 0.05 0.08*
(0.87) (2.04)
Constant −0.01 −0.01 −0.02 −0.21** −0.27*** −0.29***
(−0.13) (−0.09) (−0.25) (−2.69) (−3.94) (−4.33)
Observations 118 118 118 77 77 77
R2 0.09 0.15 0.16 0.18 0.42 0.45
t statistics in parentheses.
+p < 0.1; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
241Electoral Punishment and Protest Politics in Times of Crisis
already showed that voters punish governments less for worsening eco-
nomic conditions than in western Europe.5 Hence, it is not surprising 
that we do not find a signalling effect of protest on electoral punish-
ment for eastern Europe, either. Moreover, as Chapter 4 emphasized, 
protest during the Great Recession was to a large extent a phenomenon 
in the southern Europe. Since we cannot test our models for southern 
Europe only because of the small number of observations, we aimed to 
detect the effect of influential cases on our regressions. More specifi-
cally, we calculated the Cook’s distance for each observation used in 
model 6 in Table 10.2 to allow us to identify influential observations. 
The analysis indicates that there are three observations with a relatively 
large Cook’s distance in our western European sample: Ireland 2002 
and 2011 and Greece 2012. Only one of these observations stems from 
southern Europe, indicating that the Greek election in May 2012 is an 
influential case in our analysis. Prior to this election, there were espe-
cially large and numerous protests that were followed by an electoral 
realignment related to the breakthrough of the challenger party Syriza 
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Protest
Figure 10.2 Average marginal effect of misery on electoral loss at 
different levels of protest.
Note: Figure based on model 6 of Table 10.2.
 5 Instead, incumbents are more punished for increasing corruption, which we do not 
expect to be related to economic protest that we analyse in this paper.
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other observations from Greece and, more generally, southern Europe 
are not influential observations, which indicates that our results are not 
systematically driven by the experience of southern Europe during the 
Great Recession. Moreover, no observation in our sample has a Cook’s 
distance greater than 1, which is a common cut-off used to identify 
highly influential observations.6 Hence, the results do not change when 
we estimate a robust regression instead of a OLS regression.
In the spirit of a ‘placebo’ test, we repeated the foregoing analysis but 
used the number of protest events on cultural issues as our key depen-
dent variable (results not shown). For these non-economic protests, 
economic misery and the crisis did not systematically affect the num-
ber of protests. In other words, only economic protests are positively 
correlated with economic misery and the crisis, which increases our 
confidence that the relationship between misery and economic protests 
that we identified is, indeed, meaningful.
10.7  Protest, the Economic Vote, and the 
Decline of Mainstream Parties
We now turn to a more careful analysis of whether certain types of par-
ties systematically suffered or benefited from the instability that the 
Great Recession brought about. First, we classify parties as mainstream 
versus non-mainstream parties according to their party family, as indi-
cated by the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Bakker et al. 2015): Parties 
from the conservative, Christian democratic, social democratic, and lib-
eral party families are classified as mainstream, whereas parties from all 
other party families are classified as non-mainstream. Second, we clas-
sify parties as left-wing parties as opposed to all other political parties.
Given our results so far, we restrict our analysis to western Europe 
only.7 To assess the gains and losses of the different types of parties, we 
first analyse the impact of the economic crisis on the change in the vote 
share from election at time t and t − 1. In the first step, we are interested 
in testing whether the crisis has accelerated the pre-existing long-term 
 6 There are different cut-off values for spotting influential cases. Some suggest the 
simple guideline of D >1; others suggest going for 4/N (=number of observations), 
which in our case is 0.05. The three cases in our analysis resulted in the following 
values (listed in descending order): Ireland 2011 with a Cook’s Distance of 0.25, 
Greece 2012 with 0.25, Ireland 2002 with 0.11.
 7 The countries included in this part of the analysis are the following: Austria, Belgium, 
Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Malta, Norway, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
and the United Kingdom.
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decline of mainstream parties and how this decline is related to political 
contestation in the arena of protest politics. Therefore, we again resort 
to a simple OLS regression using the electoral punishment of individual 
parties as our dependent variable. We use the same independent vari-
ables as in the previous steps of the analysis. Following the literature 
on economic voting we also include two dummy variables that capture 
whether a party was in government and whether the prime minister was 
from that party during the legislative period between election at time 
t and t − 1. Moreover, in the baseline model we include a dummy for 
mainstream parties and we then test the differential effect of economic 
misery and protest punishment on mainstream versus non-mainstream 
parties by including interaction effects with this dummy. Similarly, in a 
second step, we repeat the analysis and evaluate the differential effect of 
economic misery and protest punishment on left-wing parties in sepa-
rate models.8
The results of this analysis are shown in Table 10.3. The results con-
firm our earlier finding that governing is costly for parties in electoral 
terms. Parties that are in government are punished more consistently 
at elections than other parties and parties that are leading the govern-
ment (i.e. the prime minister’s party) are punished even more. In gen-
eral, there is no negative effect for mainstream parties, though. These 
parties are not punished more consistently during our period of study, 
shedding some doubt on the general thesis of the long-term decline of 
mainstream parties. Yet, model 1 suggests that the electoral fortune of 
mainstream parties is related to the relative level of protest in a given 
legislative period. The interaction effect between mainstream parties 
and protest is positive and statistically significant, indicating that the 
electoral losses of mainstream parties increase as protest increases. 
To interpret this interaction effect, it is useful to plot the average mar-
ginal effects of  protest on electoral loss by party type. The results shown 
in Figure 10.3 are clear: On average, mainstream parties lose from pro-
test over economic issues, while non-mainstream parties benefit from 
heightened levels of protest (i.e. they ‘lose less’). This reinforces the 
long-term decline of established mainstream parties and supports our 
party system destabilization hypothesis (H3).
Model 2 in Table 10.2 investigates whether the signalling effect of 
protest also holds at the level of individual parties and contributes to 
 8 In total our dataset includes 548 observations, including observation for 276 main-
stream parties and 272 observations for non-mainstream parties. Similarly, our 
dataset includes 296 observations for left-wing parties and 252 observations for 
 parties that are not left-wing.
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Table 10.3. Electoral loss of mainstream and left parties in western Europe
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mainstream Left-wing
Elect. Elect. Elect. Elect.
PM = 1 0.23* 0.23* 0.22* 0.20*
(2.28) (2.26) (2.15) (1.99)
Government = 1 0.48*** 0.49*** 0.48*** 0.49***
(6.47) (6.56) (6.58) (6.62)
Protest −0.08** −0.02 −0.03 −0.02
(−2.84) (−0.41) (−0.79) (−0.33)
Mainstream party −0.04 −0.10
(−0.71) (−1.61)
Mainstream party # Protest 0.23*** 0.04
(4.86) (0.61)
Misery −0.00 −0.10* −0.00 0.05
(−0.06) (−2.02) (−0.11) (1.09)
Protest # Misery −0.02 −0.01
(−0.95) (−0.57)
Mainstream party # Misery 0.16*
(2.48)




Left party 0.02 0.02
(0.27) (0.27)
Left party # Protest 0.05 0.02
(1.10) (0.28)
Left party # Misery −0.13+
(−1.89)
Left party # Protest # Misery 0.04
(1.26)
Constant −0.15*** −0.12** −0.18*** −0.18***
(−3.71) (−2.95) (−4.30) (−4.24)
Observations 548 548 548 548
R2 0.18 0.21 0.15 0.16
t statistics in parentheses.
+p < 0.1; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
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the restructuring of the party system in western Europe. It includes 
a three-way interaction between party type, protest punishment, and 
economic misery in order to test whether the impact of economic mis-
ery on the electoral support for mainstream parties is amplified by 
protest. This three-way interaction term is positive and statistically 
significant, which indicates that political protest indeed strength-
ens the effect of economic misery on the punishment of mainstream 
parties. This is also shown in Figure 10.4, which shows the marginal 
effect of misery on the electoral performance of mainstream parties 
across different levels of protest. It suggests that the average marginal 
effect of misery increases with protest for mainstream parties, while it 
decreases for non-mainstream parties. This suggests that the relation-
ship between protest and the electoral losses of mainstream parties is 
not direct. Instead, citizens are more likely to defect from mainstream 





















Non-mainstream party Mainstream party
Party
Figure 10.3 Average marginal effect of protest on electoral loss of 
mainstream versus challenger parties.
Note: Figure based on model 1 from Table 10.3.
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stronger when there is a relatively large amount of economic protest. 
This effect still exists even when we control for possible crisis-effects 
(results not shown). Therefore, the signalling effect of protest does not 
seem only to be a phenomenon of the Great Recession. Instead, protest 
increases the likelihood that mainstream parties are attributed respon-
sibility for declining economic performance throughout our period of 
investigation.
Going one step further, we repeat the analysis but now we distinguish 
between left-wing and other parties. The results are shown in models 3 
and 4 in Table 10.3. They indicate that there are no significant effects 
between protest politics and the electoral fortunes of left-wing parties, 
which does not support the more general idea that there is a close alli-
ances between social movements and parties from the left in Europe (see 
Kriesi 1995; Maguire 1995).9 Consequently, the destabilization of the 
party system during the Great Recession and the effect of protest on its 
restructuration did not swing in one direction or the other in terms of the 
traditional left–right spectrum. Although the Great Recession and the 

























Figure 10.4 Average marginal effect of economic misery on electoral 
loss of mainstream versus challenger parties at different levels of protest.
Note: Figure based on model 2 from Table 10.3.
 9 We do not find that protests have an effect on the electoral fortune of far-left parties 
only (results not shown), either.
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and the electoral arena, this contestation has not (yet) been resolved in a 
systematic way across western Europe. This reflects the earlier analysis 
by Bartels (2014), who could not find clear-cut ideological shifts to the 
left or right in the electoral arena during the Great Recession.
Interestingly, while we cannot detect a general swing to the left or 
the right under conditions of protest mobilization in the previous analy-
sis, our more detailed results on the role of government participation 
do support the claim that the mainstream left in power has more to 
lose when it is targeted by mobilization in the streets (supporting our 
left-wing punishment hypothesis H4). Table 10.4 shows the importance 
of government status and protest for left-wing parties. According to 




PM = 1 0.22* 0.24*
(2.12) (2.46)
Government = 1 0.43*** 0.41***
(4.97) (4.90)






Government = 1 # Left party 0.16 0.17
(1.27) (1.42)
Government = 1 # Protest 0.23***
(3.65)
Left party # Protest 0.03
(0.51)






t statistics in parentheses.
+p < 0.1; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
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model 1, there is no statistically significant effect of being in govern-
ment for left-wing parties. In other words, all parties independent of 
partisan colour are, on average, punished for being in government in 
our sample. However, model 2 shows the three-way interaction between 
being in government, left-wing parties, and protest. The results of this 
effect are again best interpreted with the help of a marginal effect plots, 
shown in Figure 10.5.10 They indicate that all parties in government 
tend to lose more under conditions of high protest. However, this effect 
is especially pronounced for left-wing parties. Thus, the traditional 
allies of social movements seem to suffer most if economic protests 
 target their activities in government.
10.8  Conclusions
In the Great Recession, incumbents were heavily punished in the 
electoral arena. However, this punishment has not been limited to 
the electoral arena and, instead, citizens have also opposed govern-
















Figure 10.5 Marginal effect of protest on electoral loss of left parties 
vs. non-left parties in government.
Note: Figure based on model 2 from Table 10.4.
 10 The figure shows the effect of protest on the punishment of left-wing parties versus 
all other parties for parties that were in government prior to a given election only. 
The marginal effects for opposition parties are not shown.
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analyses show electoral punishment and protests are both driven by 
poor economic performance of a given country, confirming the eco-
nomic voting model. This relationship between economic conditions 
and economic voting as well as protests, respectively, is particularly 
strong in later stages of the crisis, as the economic fate of countries 
in Europe diverged and citizens mobilized against governments 
in countries that continued to be stuck in the economic recession. 
Moreover, electoral punishment was higher in countries that relied 
on international bailouts, which further increased the perception 
that national governments failed to steer their countries out of the 
crisis. However, surprisingly based on analysing legislative periods, 
we do not find similar effects for protest politics (see Chapter 9 for a 
more detailed analysis).
Still, it is misleading to treat punishment in the electoral arena and 
protests as independent from each other. In Europe, the citizens’ 
response to the economic crisis was first of all an electoral one, but peo-
ple also expressed their discontent through protest as shown in previous 
chapters of this volume. The analyses in this chapter show that these 
protests were coupled with electoral punishment in the sense that larger 
protests were also associated with stronger electoral punishment of 
incumbents. We present evidence that protests can amplify the impor-
tance of economic conditions for electoral punishment: By attributing 
responsibility, mobilizing citizens, and channelling their grievances 
into the electoral arena, protests increase the importance of economic 
conditions for the next general election. The ‘placebo test’ with cultural 
protests underlines that this is driven by economic protests that target 
public policies and institutions.
In addition, our findings show that the signalling effect of protest 
is not only limited to the punishment of incumbent, but it extends 
to all mainstream parties: As economic conditions worsen, citizens 
are more likely to defect from mainstream parties when there is a 
relatively large amount of protests. The beneficiaries of this destabili-
zation of the party existing system are non-mainstream parties in gen-
eral. They feed off the discontent that citizens voice in protest politics 
and  following large protest, irrespective of the economic conditions, 
they are likely to win more votes in the next general election. In sum, 
our analyses point to a destabilizing effect of the Great Recession on 
political competition in Europe but this destabilization has not been 
resolved in one way or another: The political system across Europe 
has not systematically swung in one direction or the other, as differ-
ent  parties have benefited in different regions. Importantly, we do 
not observe a close connection between the electoral fortunes of the 
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political left and economic protests in general, although it is the politi-
cal left that gets punished most heavily when in government under 
conditions of high protest mobilization.
The next chapter will again take up the question of how electoral 
and protest politics are connected to each other in times of crisis, 
but it will zoom in on political parties’ activities in the streets of 
Europe. The result from this chapter suggests that especially parties 
in opposition might have a lot to gain from realigning with actors in 
the streets.
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